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THE ABOLITION OF TORT LIABILITY
FOR NEGLIGENCE FOR ACTS
NOT ENTERED INTO FOR PROFIT
JAMES T. BRENNAN*
The law suit has as its primary purpose the collection of money
damages from the defendant. In the final analysis damages are
what the law is all about. Logically, the question of liability takes
precedence over damages. Most legal scholars and judges concern
themselves with liability. However, the determination of no liability
is merely the determination that the court will not order the
defendant to pay damages to the plaintiff. Practicing attorneys and
the public are little interested in the symmetry of legal logic, but
they are interested in the amount of damages which are awarded
by the courts.
Though it is not always true,' when a law suit is brought
demanding damages, a net loss to society generally has occurred;
and the court is being asked to shift the burden of this loss from
one party to another rather than being asked merely to equalize
accounts.
Compartmentalized legal theory is as much with us today as
in the days of the writs. Suits for damages may conveniently be
divided into suits based upon contract and tort. The same set of
facts giving rise to the law suit may abstractly create a cause of
action in contract and a cause of action in tort.2 Yet different
legal rules with different legal and practical consequences follow
from whether the action is characterized to be one in tort or in
contract.3 This might be called sheer nonsense, except that whether
one party recovers at all from another, and how much he may
recover is determined by the characterization the court places on
the occurrence giving rise to the law suit.4
If the action is deemed to be in contract, the questions affecting
liability are whether a contract was formed and whether the de-
fendant performed. There are no defenses except prior breach by
*Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall Law School. B.A., 1958, Yale;
L.L.B., 1963, Harvard.
1. For instance, recovery in Quasi-contract for unjust enrichment.
2. Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929) ; Inglis v. American Motors
Corp., 2 Ohio 2d 132 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
3. Hawkins v. McGee, supra note 2.
4. Ibid.
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the plaintiff available to the defendant.5 The statute of limitations
is generally considerably longer on contract actions than on tort
actions.6 If the action is deemed to be in tort, it may either be a
deliberate or a negligent tort. Even as to deliberate torts, such as
battery, there may be explanatory defenses available to the defendant
such as consent,7 or self-defense.8  In negligent torts, the defendant
has the defenses of assumption of the risk,' and contributory neg-
ligence,10 as well as the general defense that his conduct was not
the proximate cause of the injury."
There is a fundamental difference between actions based on a
contract and those based on tortious conduct. Before the contract
was entered into, the defendant had no duty to perform his promise
to the plaintiff. He agreed to legally bind himself to perform his
promise to the plaintiff, but he did not agree to undertake any
further duties toward the plaintiff than those he promised. 12  In
actions based on tort, the law itself has imposed upon the defendant
a duty toward the plaintiff. It is the law, not the defendant, which
created the duty, and therefore it is the law, not the defendant's
conduct, which determines the scope of the defendant's duty toward
the plaintiff. The difference is that in the action based upon the
contract, the defendant voluntarily assumed certain duties toward
the plaintiff and by the assumption of only certain duties, refused
to accept further duties; 13 whereas in the action based upon tort
the defendant never voluntarily assumed any duties, so there can-
not be any inference from his conduct that he refused to assume
further duties.
The fundamental difference in the origin of the duty of the
defendant toward the plaintiff has given rise to separate rules of
damages for actions founded in contract and those founded in tort.
5. Assuming both parties were legally capable of contracting, there are no equitable
defenses, such as fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence which would make the con-
tract voidable, and the promised act was not and has not become illegal.
6. The North Dakota statute of limitations for simple contracts is six years. N. D.
CENT. CODE § 28-01-16 (1960). The six year period also applies to most torts, although
the period is two years for specified torts. N. D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18 (1960). This is un-
usual. More typical are the six year Ohio statute of limitation for actions based on a con-
tract in writing OHIO REv. CODE § 2305.07 (Baldwin 1964) and the two year limitation on
actions based upon injury to persons or property. OHIO REV. CODE § 2305.10 (Baldwin
1964).
7. McAdams v. Windham, 208 Ala. 492, 94 So. 742 (1922): Nichols v. Colwell, 113
Ill. App. 219 (1903); Gibeline v. Smith. 106 Mo. App. 545, 80 S.W. 961 (1904) : Vendrell
v. School Dist. No. 26C, 233 Or. 1, 376 P.2d 406 (1962) ; Ogden v. Rabinowitz, 86 R.I. 294,
113 A.2d 416 (1957).
8. Cain v. Skillin, 219 Ala. 228, 121 So. 521 (1929); Higgins v. Minaghan, 78 Wis.
602, 47 N.W. 941 (1891).
9. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Nixon, 271 U. S. 218 (1926); Morton v. California
Sports Car Club, 163 Cal.App.2d 685, 329 P.2d 967 (1958); Crone v. Jordan Marsh Co.,
269 Mass. 289. 169 N.E. 136 (1929); Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 349 Mo. 1215,
164 SW.2d 318 (1942) ; Clise v. Prunty, 108 W.Va. 635, 152 S.E. 201 (1930).
10. Wolfe v. Green Mears Constr. Co.. 134 Cal.App.2d 654, 286 P.2d 433 (1955); Reep
v. Greyhound Corp., 171 Ohio St. 199, 168 N.E.2d 494 (1960) ; Hutchinson v. Mitchell, 143
W.Va. 280. 101 S.E.2d 73 (1957).
11. Ford v. Trident Fisheries Co., 232 Mass. 400, 122 N.E. 399 (1919) North v. John-
son, 58 Minn. 242, 59 N.W. 1091 (1893); Weeks v. McNulty, 101 Tenn. 495, 48 S.W. 809
(1898).
12. This, however, does not require that the law should not hold him responsible for
the entire loss to the plaintiff which was proximately caused by his failure to perform his
promise as agreed.
13. See footnote 12, supra.
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The great fundamental difference between contract and tort damages
is the scope of liability of the defendant for the consequences of
his conduct. The landmark contract case of Hadley v. Baxendale"l
stands for the proposition that only those damages which were within
the contemplation of the parties when they exchanged their promises
may be collected upon a breach of contract.'15 This principle arose
in a case where the defendant was negligent in performing his
promise. The doctrine has been upheld in a long line of cases.' 6
The doctrine has been applied by analogy to all contract situations.
It has had perhaps its greatest difficulty in the long line of tele-
graph cases in which the telegraph companies attempted to limit
their liability to the higher price of the telegram or special higher
limits available to the sender for an added charge.17
The limitation of contract damages to those within the con-
templation of the parties at the time they entered into the contract
is hard to justify if the defendant deliberately or negligently failed
to perform his promise and caused greater loss to the plaintiff
than that amount. Practically however, this solution appears in
accord with justice, since the price of defendant's promise to
perform is likely to have been based on his cost of performance
plus a reasonable profit."" If the defendant had been notified of
the likelihood that he would be held responsible for greater damages,
he would have added a further charge for insurance. This is com-
monly done in baggage bailments. On the other hand, any person
of reasonable intelligence can foresee that the other party may fail
to perform his promise within the agreed time, or even at all.
It is a question of who should bear the burden of this foreseeable
risk of loss which either party, if he desired, might insure against.
When we turn our attention to torts, we are faced with several
different classifications which deserve individual treatment. There
are the absolute torts, such as trespass, which are a historical
appendix in our law and should undoubtedly be abolished. 9 There
are also the modern absolute liability torts for ultrahazardous ac-
tivities based upon the sound social policy that those who engage
for profit in businesses which are hazardous to their fellow human
beings should be required to pay in full for any losses they cause
by their activities.20 Insurance is a legitimate cost of the deliber-
ate operation of such businesses.
14. 9 Exch. 341 (1854).
15. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 330 (1932).
16. Elzy v. Adams Exp. Co., 141 Iowa 407, 119 N.W. 705 (1909): Bates Mach. Co. v.
Norton Iron Works, 113 Ky. 372, 68 S.W. 423 (1902) ; Hammer V. Schoenfelder, 47 Wis.
455, 2 N.W. 1129 (1879).
17. Kerr S.S. Co. v. Radio Corp.. 245 N.Y. 284. 157 NE. 140 (1926): Stone & Co. v.
Postal Tel. Co., 35 R.I. 498, 87 A&I 319 (1913). See also Germain Fruit Co. v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 137 Cal. 598, 70 Pac. 658 (1902): Cultra v. Western Union Tel. Co., 61
I.C.C. 541 (1921).
18. See Cultra v. Western Union Tel. Co., supra note 17.
19. Only nominal damages will be recoverable for a technical trespass. Henry v. Wil-
liams, 132 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. 1939).
20. Britton v. Harrison Const. Co., 87 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. W. Va. 1948) ; Luthringer v.
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Then we come to the deliberate or wilful torts. Battery is an
excellent example. At first blush, it appears desirable to hold the
defendant responsible not only for the readily anticipatable injuries,
but also those which, while intellectually foreseeable, were not
likely results but nonetheless did occur in the particular case.21
The difficulty is that a simple right uppercut might make an indi-
vidual liable not for a few broken teeth but for supporting an
invalid and a large family for life. Not only harm to the plaintiff,
but the seriousness of the defendant's conduct ought to be con-
sidered if justice is to be done to the defendant as well as to the
plaintiff. After all, the defendant may be appropriately, in fact
most appropriately, punished for his unlawful conduct by the criminal
law. Since his discharge in bankruptcy would be impossible,2 2 an
unlucky defendant could have all of his property taken away from
him and his wages garnisheed for the rest of his life. The effect
on the defendant would be out of all proportion to the gravity of
his conduct in a fleeting instant. On the other hand, there might
be no doubt that he caused the plaintiff and society a $500,000 loss.
Yet such losses are foreseeable and can be insured against. While
it should be against public policy to allow potential defendants in
actions based on deliberate torts to obtain insurance against liabil-
ity for their conduct, certainly individual insurance plans or state
insurance could protect each individual in society against losses he
might sustain by such conduct of others.
The problem of what should be the extent of liability of a
defendant for negligent conduct is much the same as that of what
should be the extent of liability of a defendant for deliberate tortious
conduct, with the equitable exception that in the case of negligence
much less reason exists to punish the defendant. Justice to the
defendant cries that he not be held liable for damages he might
not reasonably have foreseen. 23 This, however, is not a very helpful
standard to the defendant because in many cases where he may
have been negligent, he could reasonably have foreseen great harm
to innocent persons. Anyone driving an automobile can reasonably
foresee damages of several hundred thousand dollars resulting from
Moore, 31 Cal.2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948): Caporale v. C.W. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc., 149
Conn. 79, 175 A.2d 561 (1961): Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St. Mary's Woolen Mfg. Co..
60 Ohio St. 560, 54 N.E. 528 (1899): Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H. & C. 774 (1865), reversed
L. R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), affirmed L. R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
21. The general rule is that liability for battery extends to the consequences which the
defendant did not intend and could not have reasonably foreseen. Ware v. Carney, 139 F.
Supp. 71 (D. Mass. 1956) : Watson v. Rinderknecht, 82 Minn. 235, 84 N.W. 798 (1901):
Transil v. Bayer, 85 Neb. 431, 123 N.W. 445 (1909) ; Harris v. Hindman, 130 Or. 15, 278
Pac. 954 (1929) ; Vosberg v. Putney, 80 Ws. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891).
22. 11 U.S.C. 35 (a) (2).
23. Some recognition of this problem does exist: "While the fundamental rule of law
is to award compensation, yet rules for ascertaining the amount of compensation to be
awarded are formed with reference to the Just rights of both parties, and the standard
fixed for estimating damages ought to be determined not only by what might be right for
the plaintiff to receive In order to afford just compensation, but also by what Is just to
compel defendant to pay." C. J. S. Damages § 71 (1966). See also Van Gorden v. United
States, 91 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Mo. 1950): Fornwalt v. Reading Co., 79 F. Supp. 921 (E.
D. Pa. 1948) ; Hansen v. Oregon-Wash. R. & Nay. Co., 97 Or. 190, 188 Pac. 963 (1920)
Grisom v. Heard, 47 So.2d 108 (La App. 1950).
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momentary negligence.2 4  However, were we to limit the negligent
defendant's liability to the damages he might reasonably have fore-
seen would result from his negligence, would it be fair as between
an innocent party harmed by the defendant's negligence and the
defendant that the innocent injured party rather than the negligent
defendant should absorb the loss to the extent which the actual
loss exceeded what the defendant might have reasonably foreseen?
The courts have universally answered "No". 2 5  Tort law is the
only area of the law which has a no-limit basis. In the criminal
law we are dealing with morally more reprehensible conduct than
is normally the case in tort law, yet the criminal law provides a
maximum penalty for the violation of any particular statute.2 6 The
reason for our no-limit tort law may be that we persist in matching
the moral culpability of the plaintiff and the defendant. And the
idea that all losses caused by negligence should be fully recoverable
is a strong one in our society. Another possible reason is that we
have failed to conceive of any reasonable limitation on recovery
which would be just to plaintiffs and defendants alike. Foresee-
ability is hardly a practical standard at all. The natural and prox-
imate consequences are at least practically ascertainable in most
cases.
27
All losses are not recoverable in our society. On his own prop-
erty a person may be injured accidentally or through his own
negligence and not be able to recover from anyone. On the property
of others or the state, he may be injured and have no legal right
to recover from anyone. Until recently, government and charitable
immunity barred recovery in a large number of cases. The severest
injuries may be suffered in military service. Compensation for them
depends upon government largess to its veterans.2 8  Many persons
are injured in participating sports and are unable to receive com-
pensation for their injuries. Compensation for injuries cannot be
considered so universal as to be above reconsideration.
In order to understand the difference between the damages
24. Foreseeability is semantic crystal ball gazing. God can foresee everything. Man's
experience, intelligence, concentration, and knowledge of facts influence what he fore-
sees at any given instant. Hindsight is never foreseeability.
25. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 25(b) (1966) states, "In the case of torts not amounting to
willful or wanton wrongs, the general rule is that the wrongdoer is liable only for such
consequence as were or should have been contemplated or might, in the light of attend-
ing circumstances, have been foreseen, or such as according to common experience and
the usual course of events miht reasonably have been anticipated. In cases of tort, the
wrongdoer is liable for the natural and probable consequences of his act or omission, al-
though their particular form or character was not foreseen or anticipated, and it is not
necessary that the particular consequences shall have been within the contemplation of
the wrongdoer." See also Suit v. Scandrett, 119 Mont. 570, 178 P.2d 405 (1947).
26. This is true despite the fact that unforeseen consequences may transform a crim-
inal act into a more serious crime.
27. This lack of practical alternative standard reinforces our moral and historical
predilection to awarding consequential damages without limit in tort actions. The prev-
alence of liability insurance also helps perpetuate this measure of damages against the
insured and uninsured alike.
28. The leading surviving Japanese fighter ace of World War II, who was blinded in
one eye and severly wounded over Guadalcanal states, "With the surrender, I was thrown
out of the Navy. Despite my wounds and my long service, there was no possibility of a
pension. We were the losers, and pensions or disability payments are received only by
the veterans of a victor nation." SAKAI, SAMURAI at 11 1948).
412
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available in tort actions and those available in contract actions, it
is necessary to examine various classifications of damages. For
practical purposes, both nominal and punitive damages will be
ignored as irrelevant and immaterial to a re-examination of the
extent of liability for damages caused by tortious conduct. Two
distinct classifications of damages should be helpful: (1) damage
to property as opposed to injury to human beings, and (2) past
losses as opposed to future losses. Certain torts require the further
distinction between damages to material property as opposed to
damages to intangible property.
It is relatively easy to approximate the value of a loss when
the loss is to property. All property is bought and sold and repaired
on the open market. Even for those types of property in which
there is little or no active trading, experts can be found who can
give an approximate valuation. Physical injury to the body, how-
ever, presents more difficult problems in valuation. We can
actually determine the cost of repairs to the human body. The cost
of physician's services, hospital care, drugs, therapy, etc., are readily
and accurately ascertainable. The law has taken the position that
there should be compensation for pain and suffering. 29 Beyond the
fact that we know it exists, the intensity and duration of pain and
suffering in any particular case are at present unmeasurable. It
is obvious that any monetary amount awarded for pain and suffer-
ing must be totally speculation. 30  For the moment ignoring the
distinction between permanent and temporary incapacitation, phy-
sical injuries may be divided into 3 categories: (1) Those injuries
which in some way diminish the individual's earning capacity,
(2) those which cause the individual inconvenience and/or pain,
and (3) those which affect the social life of the individual. It is
clear that the only category of physical injury which can even be
approximated in monetary terms with reasonable certainty is in-
juries which diminish the individual's earning capacity. The reason
is obvious; earning capacity is normally measured in monetary
terms. There is a market place for it.31 Any attempt to put a
monetary valuation on inconvenience, pain, or social problems1
2
must be highly speculative.
3 3
29. Hickenbottom v. Delaware, L. & W. R. 122 N.Y. 91, 25 N.E. 279 (1890) Hunt v.
Boston Terminal Co., 212 Mass. 99 98 N.E. '786 (1912) ; Middleboro Coca-Cola Bottling
Works v. Ball, 262 Ky. 101, 89 S.W.2d 875 (1936); Illinois Cent. R. v. Frick, 256 Ky.
317, 76 S.W.2d 13 (1934) ; Lane v. Southern R., 192 N.C. 287, 134 S.E. 855 (1926).
30. Thus it is said that the amount to be awarded rests within the discretion of the
jury. Daniels v. Payne, 49 N.D. 370, 191 N.W. 776 (1922).
31. Reynolds v. Clark, 28 Del. 250, 92 Atl. 873 (1914) ; Laird v. Chicago R.I. & P. Rv.,
100 Iowa 336, 69 N.W. 414 (1896) ; Gregory v. Slaughter, 124 Ky. 345, 99 S.W. 247 (1907)
McKenna v. Citizens Natural Gas Co., 201 Pa. 146, 50 Atl. 922 (1902).
32. Scott v. Cowan, 114 Kan. 32, 217 Pac. 698 (1923); Main v. Grand Rapids G.H. &
M. Ry., 207 Mich. 473, 174 N.W. 157 (1919) ; Vascoe v. Ford, 212 Miss. 370, 54 So.2d 541
(1951) ; Kierkowski v. Connell, 253 Pa. 566, 98 Atl. 766 (1916).
33. Bucker v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Kurta v. Probelske, 324 Mich. 179,
36 N.W.2d 889 (1949) ; Kulengowski v. Withington, 222 S.W.2d 579 (Mo. App. 1949).
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We have seen that only the cost of medical treatment " and
lost income resulting from an injury 5 may be estimated with any
reasonable degree of certainty. Estimating or ascertaining damages
with reasonable certainty presupposes that the loss has already
occurred and become fixed. Future medical expenses 8 and loss of
future earnings37 are speculative because these losses have not as
yet been incurred.88 They become increasingly more speculative
for each month and year they are removed from the date of the
award. Loss of earnings and medical expenses for the first few
months after an award may be subject to reasonably accurate esti-
mation. What losses will be incurred by the injured person 20 years
hence because of his injury can only be ascertained by looking into
a magic crystal ball. Of the two, future medical expenses are much
more capable of estimation. The cost of any operations and other
services, which it can presently be stated will be required in the
future, may be fairly accurately estimated. Loss of future earnings
is highly speculative. The reason is that two simultaneous equations
with two unknowns are involved. We do not know what the person's
future earnings or future way of life would have been had the
injury not occured. We don't know what he will do in the future
now that the injury has occured. We can only foresee that in most
cases the permanently injured individual will adapt his future life
to his injury. This may or may not cost him an economic loss in
the future. 9
There are several additional factors which should be considered
in conjunction with monetary awards for future medical expenses,
pain and suffering and loss of income. First there is inflation. 0
Inflation has been the general historical rule since ancient times.
It may not occur in the short run, but over a lifetime inflation is
bound to decrease the purchasing power of a dollar awarded year
before. Since part of principal as well as income from the prin-
cipal would theoretically be consumed by the injured party each
34. Tomey v. Dyson, 76 Cal.App.2d 212, 172 P.2d 739 (1946) ; Sezzin v. Stark, 187 Md.
241, 49 Atl. 742 (1946) ; Jyachosky v. Wensli, 240 N.C. 217, 81 S.E.2d 644 (1954).
35. Osterode v. Almquist, 89 Cal.App.2d 15, 200 P.2d 169 (1948); Winter v. Pennsyl-
vania R., 45 Del. 108, 68 A.2d 513 (1949); Tozer v. Kerr, 342 Mich. 136, 69 N.W.2d 171
(1955); Blackton v. McCarthy, 231 Minn. 303, 42 N.W.2d 818 (1950).
36. Birmingham Elec. Co. v. Farmer, 251 Ala. 148 36 So 2d 343 (1948) ; Buswell v.
City & County of San Francisco, 89 Cal.App.2d 123, 20 P.2d 115; Walton v. Grant, 302
Ky. 194, 194 S.W.2d 366 (1946) ; Kowarakis v. Hawver, 208 Miss. 697, 45 So.2d 278 (1950)
Petty v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 355 Mo. 824, 198 S.W.2d 684 (1947).
37. Florida Greyhound Lines v. Jones, 60 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1952) ; Western & Atlantic
R. v. Burnett, 79 Ga. App. 530, 54 S.E.2d 357 (1949) ; Atlantic Coast Line R. v. Ouzts, 82
Ga. App. 36, 60 S.E.2d 770 (1950) ; Beam v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 770 Ohio App. 419, 68
N.E.2d 159 (1945).
38. Of course the courts don't describe them as speculative because they are recover-
able. If the courts admitted the highly speculative nature of such losses, it is doubtful if
they would be recoverable.
39. The chances are almost as great that he will make more money in the future in
the occupation he adopts because of his injury than he would have made in the occupation
he would have had but for the injury.
40. Southern Pacific Co. v. Zehnle, 163 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1947); Hord v. National
Homeopathic Hosp., 102 F. Supp. 792 (D.D.C. 1952), affirmed 204 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir.
1953) ; Boboricken v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 70 (W.D.Wash. 1947); Aasen v. Aasen,
328 Minn. 1, 36 N.W.2d 27 (1949) ; Nobbe v. Hardy Continental Hotel Sys. of Minn., 225
Minn. 496, 31 N.W.2d 332 (1948); Koenigs v. Thome, 226 Minn. 14, 31 N.W.2d 534 (1948).
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year, theoretically, inflation should cut down the living standard the
award was designed to guarantee the injured party. A second fac-
tor is the human propensity to spend. A carefully measured out
monetary award, if adequate, should provide the capital4 ' necessary
to maintain the injured individual in the future in the standard of
living to which he was accustomed before the injury. Once in a
great while, awards for future loss of income and medical expenses
may be conserved to do just this. However, in the great majority
of cases, the recipient of the award manages to spend the entire
award within two or three years so that in fact he received one
bonus fling for his injury, and thereafter must make his way in
the world with his injury just as though he had never received any
award for future medical expenses, pain and suffering, and loss of
earnings.4 2  Then there is the high cost of collecting the award.
The contingent attorney's fee takes from 25 to 50 percent of the
award, and there may be other sizeable costs of collection, such
as expert witness fees, in addition.
Contract damages are awarded for measurable past losses of
profit,4 except in rare cases where a basically tort action is pro-
secuted under a warranty theory.44 Thus contract cases present
few of the problems of measurement of damages which are present
in tort actions. Loss of past profits is usually readily ascertainable
and loss of future profits are usually held to be too speculative 45
to be recoverable in contract cases.4 6 Yet future loss of earnings
to the individual is exactly analagous to loss of future profits to
a business.
Losses due to negligence in our society will continue to occur.
There is need for thoughtful reconsideration of the most socially
desirable means of compensating injuries caused by negligence and
the injuries which follow in its wake. We are talking about two
things-compensation and deterrent. Damages are presently used
in tort actions in both capacities. Possible tort liability is at pres-
ent hardly a deterrent to the adequately insured motorist. The real
deterrent to the insured motorist is the possibility that if he is
negligent, he himself will be injured or killed . Perhaps we should
41. Hallada v. Great Northern Ry., 244 Minn. 81, 69 N.W.2d 673 (1955): Borcherding
v. Eklund, 156 Neb. 196, 55 N.W.2d 643 (1952) ; Wentz v. T. E. Connolly, Inc., 273 P.2d
485 (Wash. 1954).
42. On one trip to Europe two of the three other occupants of the author's cabin were
traveling to Europe on insurance money collected from automobile accidents.
43. Sward v. Nash, 230 Minn. 100, 40 N.W.2d 828 (1950); Norwood v. Carter, 242
N.C. 152, 87 S.E.2d 2 (1955) ; Consumer's Co-op Ass'n. v. Sherman. 147 Neb. 901, 25 N.W.
2d 548 (1947); Burt v. Lake Region Flying Serv., 78 N.D. 928, 54 N.W.2d 339 (1952)
Bale v. Brudevig, 77 N.D. 494, 43 N.W.2d 753 (1950).
44. See note 2, supra.
45. 'Tovell v. Legum, 207 Ga. 193, 60 S.E.2d 339 (1950); Keener Oil & Gas Co. v.
Stewart, 172 Okla. 143, 45 P.2d 121 (1935) :Jurec v. Raznik, 104 Mont. 45, 64 P.2d 1076
(1937); M. Schulz Co. v. Gether, 183 Wis. 491, 198 N.W. 433 (1924); Marcante v. Hein,
51 Wyo. 389, 67 P.2d 196 (1937).
46. Of course anticipatory breach may give rise to the problem of ascertaining what
a future situation would have been. See Kay Petroleum Co. v. Piergross, 137 Conn. 620,
79 A.2d 829 (1951).
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divorce deterrence from compensation in our thinking about negli-
gent acts not entered into for profit.
It might be desirable to divide all torts into those which occur
in connection with the operation of an enterprise entered into for
profit and those acts which are not connected in any way with
profit making. Activities engaged in for profit should, as far as
practical, pay their entire social cost. They may easily pass on
to the ultimate consumer the true cost of the enterprise by any
price increase necessitated by adequate insurance coverage.
Activities which are not entered into for the purpose of profit
present a more difficult problem. The loss occurs regardless of
whether there is legal liability or not. Liability is in fact irrelevant
to compensation. Insurance, government or private, is the obvious
solution. The question is who should be the insured; and if insurance
coverage is inadequate, who should bear the loss. Historically, the
burden has been placed on the tortfeasor for moral reasons. Since
insurance is the answer, the question who is most likely to obtain
adequate insurance becomes relevant. But the answer to this ques-
tion is determined by the historical development of tort liability.
Today the home owner and automobile driver are more likely than
the pedestrian to have adequate insurance against the medical ex-
penses and future loss of earnings which may foreseeably be caused
by the pedestrian falling on a defective sidewalk or being struck by
a speeding car. However, this is not ordained in the stars. The
extent of Blue Cross and major medical insurance in the total popu-
lation today is high. Loss of income insurance coverage is growing.
If our tort liability law for negligence had not developed along its
present lines, it is likely that all the employed population would,
through one source or another, have insurance coverage against
medical expenses and future loss of earnings because of accidents
both negligent and non-negligent.
The advantages of such insurance coverage against losses due
to torts over our present system are twofold. First, all of the
expenses and uncertainty incident to the question of determining
liability would be saved. The only question would be the amount of
compensation which should be recovered. Secondly, each individual
would determine for himself the amount of protection which he
wished to have, both for medical expenses and for loss of income.
He would not be dependent upon the chance financial responsibility
of the tortfeasor.
The abolition of tort liability for negligence in activities not
entered into for profit would make it impossible for a person to
have his lifetime savings wiped out by momentary negligence be-
cause of inadequate insurance coverage of the resultant loss to the
insured person. And if a person were injured by the negligence of
another as is foreseeable, he would be able to collect his damages
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up to the amount of the protection he had purchased for himself.""
The incidence of negligence would then have to be combatted by
the criminal law.
The extent of future losses must always be speculative. The
only really just solution is their abolition. This could, as a practical
matter, only be accomplished through the medium of government,
rather than private, insurance as a prerequisite for the abolition of
awards for losses which may occur in the future because of an
occurence in the past is the establishment of a permanent institu-
tion to which the injured may periodically apply in the future for
compensation payments for losses which they can demonstrate they
suffered in any given period because of the past occurence.
47. This of course would depend upon the good faith of the insurer. At present one
cannot rely too heavily on the good faith of insurance companies. Whether the insurance
companies or unscrupulous plaintiffs and attorneys were the original cause of the situation
is debatable and really irrelevant to a proper social solution to the problem of just and
adequate compensation for losses due to negligence. If the insured were seeking to re-
cover from his insurer, it is predictable that competition among insurers would place them
under considerable pressure to honor all just and reasonable claims. '
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